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NEW LIGHT ON AN OLD DEBATE:
NEGLIGENCE v. SCIENTER IN AN SEC
FRAUD INJUNCTIVE SUIT
INTRODUCTION

The federal securities laws have as fundamental objectives
"[t]he maintenance of fair and honest markets in securities and
the prevention of inequitable and unfair practices in such markets."' To attain these goals, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is empowered by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to enact rules and regulations protecting investors from fraudulent and deceitful practices in the sale and purchase
of securities. 2 Section 10(b) has been implemented through the pro,Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 639 (1971).
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), which
was enacted to prohibit fraud in the purchase and sale of securities, provides in part:
It -shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange2

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Section 10(b) has become so widely used that it has been declared "the most litigated
[provision] in the federal securities laws." SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465
(1969).
The original federal anti-fraud provision is § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1970), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Since § 17(a) refers to the "offer or sale of any securities," it is applicable only to purchasers
victimized by fraudulent sellers. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1424 (2d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as Loss]; Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the
Regulation of CorporateManagement, 59 CORNELL L. Rxv. 27, 29 n.7 (1973). This limitation
left a void in the make-up of the federal securities laws which § 10(b) was created to fill.
Adopted pursuant to § 10(b) by the Commission in 1942, rule 10b-5 proscribes fraud in
both the purchase and sale of securities and thus covers situations left unregulated by § 17(a).
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mulgation of rule 10b-5, which prohibits fraudulent practices "in
3
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
In the ongoing effort to free securities markets of fraudulent
activities, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have become the focal points
of both SEC injunctive actions and private suits commenced by
investors seeking to recover damages. 4 A much litigated question
has been whether scienter, usually defined as an intent to defraud,
deceive, or manipulate,5 must be established as a prerequisite to
See 3 Loss, supra at 1426. Rule 10b-5 contains language almost identical to that used in §
17(a):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), quoted in note 2 supra.
Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empowers the SEC to seek injunctions against violations of § 10(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V 1975), quoted in note 8
infra; SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279
(7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
A judicially-created action for damages occasioned by the violation of § 10(b) and rule
10b-5 was first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
and subsequently was accepted by other courts in the federal judicial system. See, e.g.,
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th
Cir. 1965); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
1 In the realm of the securities law, scienter has proven to be an elusive concept. Consequently, it has long been the subject of controversy and discussion. See, e.g., Bucklo, Scienter
and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bucklol; Campbell,
Elements of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiffs Reasonable
Conduct, 26 S.C.L. REv. 653 (1975); Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct
to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1206 (1970);
Note, Scienterand Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057 (1969); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations underRule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. RPv.824 (1965); 82 Hmv. L. REv.938 (1969); Note,
Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule 10b-5, 63 MICH.
L. REV. 1070 (1965).
Dean Prosser has characterized "scienter" as "the intent to deceive, to mislead, to convey
a false impression." W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 107, at 700 (4th ed. 1971). According
to Prosser, the intent required for a common law action of deceit may be established by
demonstrating the existence of any one of three states of mind. The first and most familiar
is where "the speaker believes his statement to be false." Id. at 701. The second exists when
the statement "is made without any belief as to its truth, or with reckless disregard whether
it be true or false." Id. The third is where the individual does not know if the fact asserted is

1977]

SEC INJUNCTIVE SUITS

obtaining relief. With respect to private damage actions premised
upon rule 10b-5, the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark
case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,I recently held that scienter is
a required element. The Court has not as yet determined, however,
whether scienter must be established in suits brought by the SEC
to enjoin violations of rule 10b-5.
This Note will examine the open question of a scienter requirement in 10b-5 injunctive actions. The Hochfelder decision will be
analyzed, in an attempt to ascertain its impact upon the SEC injunction suit. Post-Hochfelder cases in which the federal courts
have grappled with the problem whether scienter is a necessary
element in a 10b-5 injunctive suit will then be examined. Finally,
this Note will weigh the merits of imposing a scienter requirement
and evaluate the effects that such a requirement might have upon
the SEC fraud injunction action.
THE SEC INJUNCTION ACTION
Pursuant to section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 19337 and
section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 the SEC may
commence an action to enjoin violations of the federal securities
laws. Since the SEC's power to pursue a fraud injunction is conferred by statute, the -Commission does not bear the same burden
true, but his representation dictates that he possesses such knowledge. Id. In the third situation, Prosser argued, the defendant has the necessary intent to deceive because he has misrepresented the actual extent of his knowledge. Id. Since the knowledge possessed by the defendant may be determined on a "reasonably should have known" basis, however, Prosser feared
that in this last class of cases the line between intentional conduct and negligence may be
crossed. Id.
One commentator contended that the Hochfelder Court has read the common law fraud
standard into § 10(b) actions. Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and 10b-5, 32 Bus. LAw.
147, 148-49 (1976). Haimoff asserted that, in so doing, the Court has merely worked "a minor
revision in the verbal formulation of the rules heretofore applied." Id. at 147. The author
believed that, despite the difficulties in verbalizing the rule in the past, the standards prevailing prior to Hochfelder were in reality forms of common law deceit. Id. at 148. Therefore he
concluded that the earlier standards very much resemble the one established by Hochfelder.
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V 1975). The two sections which allow the SEC to seek
injunctive relief are virtually identical. Section 21(d) provides:
Wherever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about
to engage in any acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this
chapter, [or] the rules or regulations thereunder. . .it may in its discretion bring
an action. . .to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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as a private party seeking an injunction9 and thus need not establish
irreparable harm'" or the absence of an adequate remedy at law" to
obtain injunctive relief. For an injunction to issue, it is sufficient
that the SEC demonstrate that a "'person is engaged or about to
engage in any acts, or practices which constitute or will constitute
2
a violation' of the" securities laws.'
The SEC fraud injunction is not a sanction for a past violation
of the federal securities laws;' 3 rather, it was created to enjoin ongoing and future violations.'4 As a practical matter, however, the Commission encounters ongoing violations infrequently.' 5 More often, it
is faced with a situation where a person allegedly has violated the
anti-fraud statutes in the past,'" giving rise to the inference that he
will do so in the future.' Accordingly, a court considering an SEC
request for an anti-fraud injunction usually must determine
whether a past violation has occurred, and if so, whether there is a
reasonable likelihood of recurrence.' 8 The presence or absence of
scienter generally is considered in assessing whether a past violation
has occurred,' 9 but an injunction may not be issued under the statute unless there is a likelihood of further infractions. 2° As a result,
the focal issue in an SEC fraud injunctive suit is whether, under all
the circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood of a future violation.2 ' The defendant's past conduct is important in resolving this
issue, however, since courts often view the nature and severity of a
2
prior violation as probative of the possibility of recurrence.1
3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1979.
, See SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1937).
" See SEC v. Jones, 85 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936);
3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1979.
12 SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1937) (quoting Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b),
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970)).
' See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 1976).
" See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra.
,SSee Brodsky, SEC Enforcement Weapon May Be Blunted, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1976,
at 1, col. 2, at 26, col. 2.
1

I8
Id.

,7See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
Is See 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1976; Brodsky, Wilfulness in SEC Enforcement
Proceedings,N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 1.
19 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (2d Cir. 1972).
See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1975).
See also SEC v. Geotek, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH)
95,756
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
22 SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972).
2 SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972).
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SCIENTER AND

SEC FRAUD

INJUNCTION ACTIONS PRIOR TO

Hochfelder

For some years the courts had indicated that scienter is not a
required element in an SEC action to enjoin fraudulent conduct.2
This viewpoint was adopted by the Supreme Court in SEC v.Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 24 wherein it was held that proof of
scienter is not necessary in an SEC injunctive suit brought under
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.25 The Capital Gains Court
reasoned that the Act should be construed broadly and flexibly to
promote its remedial purpose and concluded that requiring proof of
scienter would run counter to this strong policy.28 In the course of

its opinion the Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is not necessary
in a suit [by the SEC] for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages. ' 27
The reasoning of Capital Gains was applied by the Seventh
Circuit in SEC v. Van Horn.21 There, the SEC sought injunctive
relief pursuant to section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,21 an
anti-fraud provision which predates and was the source of much of
rule 10b-5's language." In determining that scienter was not required for a section 17(a) injunction, the Van Horn court reasoned
2 See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); SEC
v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541
(2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972). See
also 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuarnEs LAW, § 2.6(1) (1975); Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969).
24 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
. In Capital Gains, suit was brought pursuant to § 209(e) of the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970), a provision similar to § 20(b) of the Securities Act
of 1933 and § 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, empowering the SEC to seek an
injunction for violations of the Act. See note 8 supra.The SEC charged that the defendants
had violated § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970), the language of
which is similar to rule 10b-5:
It shall be unlawful for any investment advisor, by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client
or prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;

Id.

(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.

2 375 U.S. at 195. Interestingly, the CapitalGains Court expressly found the defendant's
conduct to have been "purposeful." Id. at 192 n.39.
Id. at 193.
371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966).
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
See note 2 supra.
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that the Securities Act of 1933, like the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, was enacted to safeguard the investor. To further this purpose,
the court held that it "is no defense to an action for an injunction
. . . that the admittedly false statements were uttered without
knowledge or that there was no intention to omit the disclosure of
13
material facts." '

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became the first
tribunal to apply this analysis in an injunctive suit commenced
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.3 2 In that seminal case, the SEC sought injunctive relief against

the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company and several of its directors, management personnel, and employees, alleging that the individual defendants had tipped and traded on material inside information,3
and that the company had issued a deceptive press release. 31 Judge
Waterman, writing for the majority, initially determined that the
federal securities laws, in the context of an SEC enforcement proceeding, had modified the common law concept of fraud to include
negligent activity by corporate insiders.3 5 Finding this to comport
"with the administrative and the legislative purposes underlying" 3
rule 10b-5, the court utilized a negligence standard in adjudging the
3
liability of the individual defendants.

1

In considering the corporation's liability for the deceptive press
release, the Second Circuit noted:
Of even greater relevance to the Congressional purpose of investor
protection is the fact that the investing public may be injured as
much by one's misleading statement containing inaccuracies
published incaused by negligence as by a misleading statement
3
tentionally to further a wrongful purpose. 1
3, Id. at 186.
3 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Previously, it

had been established that scienter is not an element of an SEC disciplinary proceeding. See,
e.g., Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
3
See note 77 infra.
11401 F.2d at 840-42.

Id. at 854-55.
Id. at 855. In finding that a negligence standard for SEC injunctive actions best
complies with the policy aspects underlying rule 10b-5, the Second Circuit relied on SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), discussed in notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra. See generally Note, Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057, 105960 (1969).
11401 F.2d at 856.
u Id. at 860. The Texas Gulf Sulphur majority, in its treatment of the press release,
greatly expanded the scope of the "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
clause of rule 10b-5 and thus widened the scope of the rule itself. The Court found that the
clause embraced any device "that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in
connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities."
Id. In so holding, the Second Circuit reversed the finding of the district court that
3

31
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Accordingly, the majority held that an injunction may be issued if
the misleading statement was the result of a failure on the part of
the defendant corporation to use due diligence in ascertaining the
facts. 9
In the Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion, Judge Waterman expressed
approval of a negligence standard for private damage actions
brought under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.40 This position encountered resistance in the concurring opinions, which voiced concern
about the possible adverse impact of a negligence standard upon the
policy favoring full disclosure of relevant corporate developments.'
The view expressed in the concurring opinions prevailed, as subsequent case law in the Second Circuit created a distinction with
respect to the standard of liability applied in SEC fraud injunctive
suits and private damage actions.4 2 Some form of intent generally
was deemed necessary to recover in a private cause of action for
fiun the absence of a showing that the purpose of the April 12 press release was to
affect the market price of TGS stock to the advantage of TGS or its insiders, the
issuance of the press release did not constitute a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule
lOb-5 since it was not issued "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."
258 F. Supp. 262, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (quoting rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-(5) (1976)),
rev'd, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The district
court's interpretation of the clause was in accord with earlier authority. See, e.g., Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The view
expressed by the Texas Gulf Sulphur majority would appear questionable in light of the
Supreme Court's recent reaffirmance of the Birnbaum rule. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
21401 F.2d at 863. The court reversed and remanded with respect to the corporate
defendant for the trial court to determine whether the press release was misleading, and if
so, whether this resulted from a lack of due diligence. Id. at 863-64. In its instructions to the
lower court, the Second Circuit noted that "if corporate management demonstrates that it
was diligent in ascertaining that the information it published was the whole truth and that
such diligently obtained information was disseminated in good faith, Rule 10b-5 would not
have been violated." Id. at 862.
11Judge Waterman observed that "a similar standard has been adopted in private actions . . . for policy reasons which seem perfectly consistent with the broad Congressional
design ....
" 401 F.2d at 855.
1, The beneficial aspects of a negligence standard in private damage actions was disputed
by Judge Friendly in his concurring opinion, id. at 864 (Friendly, J., concurring), on which
point he was joined by Judges Kaufman, id. at 869 (Kaufman, J., concurring), and Anderson,
id. (Anderson, J., concurring). Noting that "any remedy imposed against the issuer itself is
indirectly imposed on all holders of the common stock" and that a negligence standard of
liability would contravene the policy toward full disclosure of important developments affecting corporate business, id. at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring), Judge Friendly argued that the
consequences of such a standard in private actions would be "frightening." Id. at 866
(Friendly, J., concurring).
12 Compare Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), with
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1972).
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damages based on section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.13 In contrast, courts
within the circuit employed negligence as the standard in determining whether an injunction should be issued.4 The adoption of the
negligence standard was premised on the SEC's status as guardian
of the public interest and the belief that an injunction is a mild
sanction intended to be prophylactic rather than punitive in nature.4"
The dichotomy developed within the Second Circuit was not
universally accepted by other circuits. While the federal courts were
in general accord that negligence should be the standard in SEC
injunctive suits,46 disagreement existed among the circuits as to
whether intent or mere negligence was the appropriate standard in
rule 10b-5 damage actions."
Often, however, the standard actually applied by a court appeared to differ from the standard expressly adopted by that court.
For example, the circuits that had articulated a negligence standard
for private damage actions generally denied recovery in the absence
of a willful past violation. Thus, in most rule 10b-5 damage ac1 See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc);
Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972).
's See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1975).
IS See, e.g., SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Advance Growth
Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
The negligence standard was not, however, universally accepted. See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d
1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974) (standard of "willful or reckless disregard for the truth" in SEC
injunctive suits), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 648-50 (D.D.C. 1975).
At least one of the circuits which addressed the issue agreed with the Second Circuit's
dual approach. In the Tenth Circuit, when the SEC sought to enjoin a fraudulent practice, a
negligence standard was applied. See, e.g., SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
In contrast, that circuit required a showing of more than mere negligence in a private damage
action. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1007 (1975).
n Several circuits required scienter in a private action based on rule 10b-5, see, e.g.,
Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (scienter required), Clegg v. Conk,
507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974) ("scienter or conscious fault"), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1007 (1975), while others had indicated that negligence would suffice, see, e.g., White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730-36 (9th Cir. 1974) ("flexible duty" standard), Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967) (negligence), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). In the Third
Circuit, the standard was unclear. Compare Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 583 (3d
Cir. 1975), with Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 874 (1972). For further discussion of the standards used in the various circuits at
this time, see Bucklo, supra note 5.
11It was recognized in Bucklo, supra note 5, at 563, that many courts espousing negli-

19771

SEC INJUNCTIVE SUITS

tions, regardless of the purported state of mind requirement, it appears that the conduct of the defendant must have been the equivalent of actual fraud before liability for damages would ensue. 9 Even
within the Second Circuit, courts faced with SEC injunctive suits,
while claiming to apply a negligence standard, often made specific
findings of willfulness in connection with the past violation before
issuing an injunction."
This subtle displacement of the negligence standard in injunction actions, it is submitted, is related to the nature of the injunctive
suit.5 1 Since the issuance of an anti-fraud injunction is dependent
gence as the proper standard of liability refused to grant damages in the absence of proof of
scienter. The author noted that "damage awards to private plaintiffs have been confined to
cases where either knowing or reckless conduct was the cause of injury." Id. (footnote omitted).
"' As one circuit judge has observed: "[In every case where liability was found, conduct
tantamount to actual fraud existed, despite the fact that the reviewing court may have used
language broader than necessary." Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286
(3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972).
Immediately after Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit purportedly utilized a
negligence standard in SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969). Yet, in reversing the district court's denial of injunctive
relief, the court stated that the activity of certain of these defendants "constituted common
law fraud . . . and [as a result] the SEC was entitled to an injunction against them ....
407 F.2d at 461 (emphasis added); cf. Bucklo, supra note 5, at 580-81 ("relaxation of the
scienter requirement [for SEC injunctive suits] does not yet appear to have been necessary"). Thereafter, despite expressions of allegiance to the negligence standard, many decisions contained express findings of willful or reckless conduct. See, e.g., SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 810 (2d Cir. 1975) ("high degree of carelessness in failing to
comply with registration provisions"); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (2d Cir. 1974)
(finding of "driving cupidity and lack of principle and restraint"); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100-03 (2d Cir. 1972) (the defendants' conduct was "willful,
blatant, and often completely outrageous"); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424
F.2d 63, 80 (2d Cir. 1970) (recklessness). In other situations, the violations were at least
arguably willful. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N,Y.
1973). Conversely, where nonwillful violations were found, injunctions were often refused.
See, e.g., SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified on other
grounds sub. noma. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
The tendency of courts to withhold injunctions absent willful conduct was recognized by
a noted commentator:
[A] survey of the cases would indicate that for the most part injunctive relief has
not been granted without an indication by the Court that the past conduct was
wilful. Therefore, no matter what the articulated standard, Courts seem generally
to search for wilful conduct upon which to base an injunction.
Brodsky, Wilfulness in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 1,
at 2, col. 3 (footnote omitted).
11 See notes 7-22 and accompanying text supra.
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upon the probability of a future infraction, courts look for strong
proof of such likelihood.12 If it could be demonstrated that a past
violation of the anti-fraud provisions had been willful, the possibility of a future violation would be enhanced. 3 Consequently, despite
the fact that negligence was the standard purportedly applied, the
SEC's ability to show willfulness in a past infringement of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 often was crucial to its
success in obtaining an anti-fraud injunction.
THE IMPACT OF

Hochfelder AND

ITS PROGENY

Hochfelder
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,5 4 private investors who had
been swindled in a fraudulent scheme concocted by Leston Nay, the
president of First Securities Company of Chicago, commenced an
action against Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm.5 For a period of
twenty-four years, the plaintiffs placed funds in escrow accounts
which Nay had represented as being capable of yielding a high
return. In fact, money contributed to these accounts had been diverted to Nay's own use.5" Following Nay's suicide in 1968, the
scheme was discovered and the suit against the defendant was
commenced. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Ernst & Ernst
had negligently aided and abetted Nay's violations of rule 10b-5 by
failing to discover a company "mail rule" which prohibited the
opening of Nay's personal mail. The plaintiffs asserted that the
defendant's failure to list this "mail rule" in the annual audit as an
irregular practice prevented an investigation of Nay which would
have uncovered his fraudulent escrow scheme. 8 The district court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. 5 Finding that the defendant accounting firm had violated a
statutory duty to investigate and disclose any material irregularities, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and
remanded the case for trial.6 "
52

See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra.

See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1972).
See also Brodsky, Wilfulness in SEC Enforcement Proceedings,N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1976, at
1, col. 1.
" 425 U.S. 185 (1976), rev'g 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
425 U.S. at 189.
IId.
57 Id.

IId.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
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The Supreme Court, reasoning that the statutory language and
legislative history of section 10(b) dictate that scienter be established in rule 10b-5 damage actions, reversed the Seventh Circuit
and dismissed the complaint." The Hochfelder majority analyzed
the language of section 10(b) and found that "[t]he words
'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe
knowing or intentional misconduct." 2 The Court also reasoned that
the statute's use of the words "manipulative," "device," and
"contrivance," evinces "a congressional intent to proscribe a type
of conduct quite different from negligence.""3 In rejecting the SEC's
suggestion, made in an amicus brief, that rule 10b-5 may be interpreted to proscribe negligent as well as intentional behavior, the
Hochfelder Court noted that "such a reading cannot be harmonized
with the administrative history of the Rule, a history making clear
that when the Commission adopted the Rule it was intended to
apply only to activities that involved scienter." 4 Moreover, the
11503 F.2d at 1119. The Seventh Circuit discussed at length the question whether Ernst
& Ernst had breached the common law duty of inquiry. Pointing to the fact that the plaintiffs
were not in privity of contract with the defendant, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs were
precluded from basing their action on the agreement between the First Securities Company
of Chicago and Ernst & Ernst. Id. at 1105. Furthermore, the court ruled that a common law
negligence action was foreclosed because Ernst & Ernst could not have foreseen that it had
owed a duty to the plaintiffs and because the plaintiffs had not relied on the financial data
accumulated by the defendant. Id. at 1107. The court believed, however, that the plaintiffs
had stated a claim by alleging that Ernst & Ernst's negligence in failing to discover Nay's
"mail rule" had aided and abetted Nay's violation of rule 10b-5. Id. at 1104.
11425 U.S. at 193.
61Id. at 197. The Supreme Court's reasoning that the language and history of § 10(b)
require scienter is not novel. It often had been argued that the language of § 10(b) necessitates
a showing of scienter in an action based upon that section. See, e.g., 3 Loss, supranote 2, at
1766. Consequently, some authorities feared that absent a scienter requirement, rule 10b-5
might be beyond the scope of § 10(b). See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 130405 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir.)
(Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE lob-5 § 13 (rev. ed. 1976); 3 Loss,
supra note 2, at 1766 (some "watered-down" scienter necessary).
In a leading case, Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), the
Second Circuit, in the context of a private damage action, noted that "the actual language
of Section 10(b) bars adoption of a negligence standard." Id. at 1305. Finding that the words
"manipulative" and "deceptive" used in § 10(b) "negate liability for a mere negligent omission or misrepresentation," id., the Second Circuit concluded "that proof of a willful or
reckless disregard for the truth is necessary to establish liability [in a damage suit] under
Rule 10b-5." Id. at 1306 (footnote omitted). The Sixth Circuit in SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d
1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975), found that the analysis in Lanza
dictated a scienter requirement in SEC injunctive suits premised on lOb-5. 493 F.2d at 1314.
61425 U.S. at 199 (footnote omitted).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:759

Court emphasized that the scope of the rule may not exceed the
authority granted the Commission by section 10(b).11
The Supreme Court limited its decision to civil damage actions
premised on rule 10b-5, expressly refusing to address the issue
whether scienter is a required element in an injunction action under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.66 Thus, the question remains whether
the Court will uphold the distinction drawn by at least two circuits
between the state of mind required for a private damage suit and
that which must be shown in an SEC fraud injunction action.
Nonetheless, it may be contended that the Supreme Court's analysis of the language and history of section 10(b) with respect to rule
10b-5 damage actions readily is applicable to SEC enforcement actions involving the same statute.68 As Justice Blackmun observed in
his Hochfelder dissent, the meaning of the language contained in
section 10(b) should not be capable of a different interpretation
merely because the identity of the plaintiff is different. 9
As previously indicated, prior to Hochfelder many courts voiced
support for a negligence standard in SEC enforcement actions.7"
These decisions often were founded on policy considerations;7' the
Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 193 n.12.
See notes 42 & 46 supra.
, Prior to the burgeoning of the different standards for private actions and SEC suits,
Justice Harlan had noted that "both private and public actions arise under the same Rule,
and the legal problems involved in the two situations, while not identical, are closely related."
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 471 n.4 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Two commentators recently have argued that by grounding its decision on the language
of § 10(b) the Supreme Court in Hochfelder left no basis for the lower federal courts to
differentiate the SEC from a private plaintiff. Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securitiesand
Exchange Commission Rule I0b-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisalin Light of Hochfelder,
51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 778 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Berner & Franklin]. The authors
contend that the Hochfelder Court's refusal to found its opinion on narrower grounds reinforces the idea that the decision's reasoning applies when the Commission is the plaintiff in
a rule 10b-5 action. Id. at 778-81.
,1 425 U.S. at 215-18. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). While noting the "technical consistency" of the Hochfelder majority, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, expressed
concern that "an investor can be victimized just as much by negligent conduct as by positive
deception." Id. at 216. Therefore, he felt it was illogical to say "that Congress clearly intended
[to prevent] the one but certainly not the other." Id. Pointing to the use of a negligence
standard in SEC injunctive suits brought in the Second Circuit, the dissenters concluded that
"[ilf negligence is a violation factor when the SEC sues, it must be a violation factor when
a private party sues." Id. at 217-18.
70 See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279
(7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
11 The courts have emphasized the status of the SEC as guardian of. the individual
56
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courts made little attempt to refute the argument urging application of a uniform standard in all rule 10b-5 actions. But the
Hochfelder Court found the language and legislative history of section 10(b) dispositive and refused to entertain any policy arguments.72 Although the reasoning of the cases applying a negligence
standard in injunction actions is thus inconsistent with Hochfelder,
the Supreme Court's express reservation of the issue leaves the federal courts free to distinguish between rule 10b-5 damage actions
and SEC injunctive suits in fashioning scienter requirements. There
appears to be little doubt, however, that Hochfelder places added
pressure on courts maintaining this distinction to justify the logical
inconsistency inherent in it. 7"
The Post-Hochfelder Cases
Shortly after Hochfelder was decided, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, confronted with an SEC enforcement action, was called upon to determine whether the Commission
must establish scienter to obtain injunctive relief. In SEC v. Bausch
& Lomb, Inc.,7 the SEC alleged that Bausch & Lomb and its chief
executive officer, Daniel Schuman, had violated rule 10b-5. Schuman, having received information of a rumor that he had released
an earnings figure of $.60 to a financial analyst named MacCallum,
immediately telephoned MacCallum to inform him that this figure
'
75
1
A
was too "low and that $.70 to $.80 per share was more like it.
second telephone call was thereafter made by Schuman to MacCallum revising Schuman's previous estimate to between $.65 and $.75
investor, see, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1975),
and the purpose of an injunction as "prophylactic" rather than punitive in nature. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
7'425 U.S. at 214 n.33.

Recently, in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977), the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the principle announced in Hochfelder that
in deciding whether a complaint states a cause of action for "fraud" under Rule
10b-5, "we turn first to the language of § 10(b) . .

. ."

In holding that a cause of

action under Rule 10b-5 does not lie for mere negligence, the [Hochfelder] Court
began with the principle that "fa]scertainment of congressional intent with respect to the standard of liability created by a particular section of the [1933 and
19341 acts must

. .

. rest primarily on the language of that section . . . ." The

same language and the same principle apply to this case.
Id. at 1300.
7, 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
"

Id. at 1238.
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per share. Upon realizing his mistake in releasing these figures,
Schuman furnished the correct earnings figure to the Wall Street
Journal for publication. The SEC alleged76 that these disclosures
constituted the revelation of material, non-public information.77
Although it agreed with the SEC's allegation, the district court
refused to grant the injunction. Among the grounds for the refusal
was the court's belief that Hochfelder must be interpreted to require
78
proof of scienter in a rule 10b-5 injunctive suit brought by the SEC.
Judge Ward noted that the Hochfelder Court had disregarded
"policy" arguments since it had found "the language and history of
§ 10(b) dispositive."7 9 Thus, because the SEC did not establish that
Schuman had acted with the requisite intent, the injunction was
denied.' "
" Id. at 1238. The SEC's complaint also accused Schuman of making improper disclosures, in violation of rule 10b-5, during personal interviews with financial analysts on March
15, 1972. The SEC claimed that in those interviews Schuman had improperly revealed earnings estimates for 1972 and other information concerning the introduction of two new products
during the same year. As to these initial disclosures, the court felt that the evidence as to
"the revelation of earnings estimates by Schuman . . . [was] not convincing," and that
"[tihe materiality of the time of introduction of the two products . . . [had] not been
established." Id. The SEC further alleged that Schuman transgressed rule 10b-5 in a March
16, 1972 interview with another financial analyst, David MacCallum, in which Schuman
made disclosures substantially similar to those made in his March 15th interviews. The court
held that the existence of improper revelations and the materiality of any disclosures that
may have been made had not been established by the SEC. Id. at 1236-37.
11 Id. A material fact has been defined in one area of the securities laws as "an omitted
fact . . . [where] there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important .... " TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
(discussing § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)). Similar
standards have been used for determining materiality under section 10(b). See SEC v. Geon
Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Bausch & Lomb, Judge
Ward found that "an estimate of earnings is among the most material of all conceivable
revelations." 420 F. Supp. at 1238 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
19420 F. Supp. at 1240. Judge Ward believed that prior law in the Second Circuit
regarding the definition of scienter was still valid. 420 F. Supp. at 1242 n.4. The judge thus
employed as a standard of liability "'the kind of recklessness that is equivalent to wilful
fraud.'" Id. at 1243 n.4 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)). However stated,
this standard would appear to best balance the competing interests of the individual investor
and the corporate defendant. See Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter
Under Rule IOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213, 228-40 (1977). Cf. 25
EMORY L.J. 465, 476 (1976), in which it is argued that a "gross negligence" standard would
best weigh "the investor's need to recover" and "the securities industry's need to leave
'breathing room' for honest errors of judgment ....
11 420 F. Supp. at 1241 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 n.33
(1976)).
1 Id. at 1244-46. Although the bulk of its opinion dealt with the existence of a past
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A district court in the Eastern District of Virginia found the
Bausch & Lomb reasoning persuasive and held, in SEC v. American
Realty Trust,8 ' that scienter must be shown by the SEC in an injunctive suit brought under sections 17(a) and 10(b). In that case,
Chief Judge Kellam observed that the decision in Hochfelder was
premised upon the language and history of section 10(b). 2 Since
SEC injunctive suits are "creatures of statute rather than implied
rights of action," the chief judge reasoned, the Hochfelder rationale
must be applicable in those actions.8 3 The court went on to observe:
Only policy considerations which have traditionally been applied
to distinguish the two types of cases ... could support a contrary
result, but the Supreme Court in Hochfelder found no reason to
even examine such considerations, since in its opinion the language and history of [section 10(b)] were dispositive. The District
Court in SEC v. Baush & Lomb, Inc. . . . so reasoned when it held
that scienter is a necesary element in an action for injunctive relief
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Act.84
The American Realty Trust court recognized that section 17(a)
contains language almost identical to that in section 10(b), a fact
which was conceded by the SEC. 5 Accordingly, the court concluded
that scienter is also an element of an injunction action based upon
section 17(a). 6 Shortly after American Realty Trust, a district
court, in SEC v. Cenco, Inc.,87 denied the SEC an injunction due to
the absence of willful or reckless conduct on the part of the defendants." In so ruling, the Cenco court expressly followed the holding
of Bausch & Lomb.88
For the most part, however, the Bausch & Lomb reasoning has
not been adopted in subsequent decisions. The Court of Appeals for
violation, the court realized that the issuance of an injunction largely depends on the likelihood of a future violation. Assuming that a past violation had occurred, Judge Ward stated,
the SEC had failed to impress the court as to the likelihood of such a recurrence. Id. at
1244.
81[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,913 (E.D. Va. Feb. 24,
1977).
Id. at 91,439-40.
Id. at 91,440.
" Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
%5Id.
" Id.

[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

96,133 (N.D. Ill. July 28,

1977).
"

Id.

81Id. Judge Crowley felt that reckless conduct would be sufficient to satisfy the scienter
requirement. Id. at 92,100.
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the First Circuit, in SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc.,"0 ordered the
issuance of a preliminary injunction against a religious organization
and its leader to prevent violations of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 and rule 10b-5.11The defendant, a worldwide evangelical
organization, was constructing a housing development for its members in Lancaster, New Hampshire. To finance this project, the
defendant established two investment programs which involved the
sale of interest-bearing notes. Satisfied that these loan plans were
within the purview of the securities acts, Judge Aldrich, writing for
a unanimous panel, found that the defendant had employed a false
and misleading advertising campaign which failed to disclose a substantially increasing operating deficit and thereby had violated the
federal anti-fraud statutes.2 In reaching its decision, the court
stated that in an SEC enforcement action as long as conduct was
"injurious to the public, good faith, however much it may be a
defense to a private suit for past actions. . . should make no difference." 9 3 The First Circuit dismissed the contention that Hochfelder
mandates a showing of scienter in an SEC injunction action brought
under section 17(a), reasoning that section 17(a) was not affected by
the ruling in Hochfelder.9 4 Although the World Radio Mission court
did not reach the issue whether intent must be proven in an action
544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
Id. at 543.
9 Id. at 539-40.

"

' Id. at 540 (citations omitted). The court recognized that prior to Hochfelder the Second
Circuit had distinguished between the state of mind requirement in private damage actions
and those in SEC enforcement proceedings predicated on § 10(b). Accordingly, the court
implied that despite Hochfelder it would adhere to a negligence standard for SEC injunctive
suits based on rule lob-5. Id. at 540-41; see note 95 infra. Nevertheless, the First Circuit
questioned the good faith of the World Radio Mission defendants, observing that it was
"difficult to think they believed that everything they said was accurate." 544 F.2d at 540.
More importantly, the court noted that "their demonstrated intent to continue evidences, at
the least, an intent to do what they now know a federal court, as well as the SEC, has found
deceptive." Id. at 541 (footnote omitted).
11Id. at 541 n.10. The defendants had argued that since the language of § 17(a) and rule
lob-5 is virtually the same, Hochfelder requires that intent must be read into § 17(a). Id.
The First Circuit stated that Hochfelder had determined that the language of 10b-5 did not
itself require scienter but rather that, absent intent, the rule would surpass the authority
allowed the SEC by § 10(b). Reasoning that this problem did not arise with § 17(a), which is
a congressional enactment rather than a Commission rule, the court dismissed the defendants' contention as a "non sequitur." Id.
The SEC has also observed that § 17(a) is seemingly immunized from the application of
the Hochfelder logic, as that section does not contain language implying a need for scienter.
See SEC General Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, reprinted
in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 354, at F-1 (May 26, 1976). For this reason, the general
counsel of the SEC has recommended that allegations of § 17(a) violations be included in
SEC injunctive complaints whenever possible. Id. at F-3.
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based solely on rule 10b-5, it intimated that scienter need not be
established in such a suit. 5
In SEC v. Geotek,9 ' however, the district court for the Northern
District of California expressly rejected a scienter requirement in
rule 10b-5 injunctive suits. Jack Burke, a defendant in Geotek, had
managed the JB and Geotek oil exploration operations." In a 1972
affidavit filed with the SEC, Burke failed to disclose all his prior
involvements in the oil and gas business." The most notable omission was his connection with four companies which he secretly had
established and with which his exploration programs previously had
dealt.9 As a result, the SEC sought an injunction based on section
10(b) and section 17(a),110 alleging that material misstatements and
omissions had been made in the "basic documents"'' of the programs by Jack Burke and other individuals in several companies
under his control. The SEC also named Arthur Young & Company,
a certified public accounting firm, and four of its accountants as
defendants, asserting that they had aided and abetted the illegal
activity. 02
In determining the standard for adjudging whether a violation
had occurred, Judge Sweigert reiterated the belief of the First Circuit, expressed in World Radio Mission, that the Hochfelder analysis did not apply to the language of section 17(a).113 Thus, the
11In regard to Hochfelder's effect on SEC injunctive actions, Judge Aldrich stated in a
footnote that the First Circuit felt it "implausible to supppose that Congress intended to
provide a mechanism for the SEC to protect the public from the injurious schemes of those
of evil intent and yet leave the public prey to the same conduct perpetrated by the careless
or reckless." SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976).
go [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,756 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11,
1976).
11Id. at 90,720.
9I

Id.

Id. at 90,721.
Since the JB programs had not been registered with the SEC, the Commission's suit
against the defendants connected with those programs was predicated solely on §§ 10(b) and
17(a). Id.at 90,723; see note 2 supra. Because the Geotek programs had been registered, the
SEC's action against those defendants was premised upon these general anti-fraud provisions
and, in addition, §§ 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§
78n(a), 78o(d) (1970), which deal with proxy solicitations and yearly statements for registered
security issuers. See SEC v. Geotek, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,756, at 90,723 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
0I The "basic documents" of the JB exploration programs were "the JB Offering Circulars and Oil Exploration Program Agreements." Id. at 90,723 n.6. As for the Geotek operations, the "basic documents" included "the Prospectuses, Limited Partnership Agreements,
and Management Agreements." Id.
102 Id. at 90,722.
I Id. at 90,724.
107
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Geotek court followed the course traveled in World Radio Mission
and utilized a negligence standard in an injunction action based on
section 17(a).104 Unlike the World Radio Mission court, however,
Judge Sweigert found the negligence standard applicable to all the
SEC's allegations,"' including those based solely upon rule 10b-5.
Interestingly enough, in granting injunctions against' some of the
"Jack Burke" defendants, the court observed:
With respect to the several charges as to which the Court has
found againstthe Jack Burke defendants, the Court has. . . found
that the misrepresentationsand/or omissions were made by those

defendants, not merely negligently due to their failure to use ordinary care, but deliberately and with intent to deceive-i.e.,

"scienter" within the meaning of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder ....,'l
Finding that no violation had been committed by Arthur Young
and its individual accountants, and observing that their conduct
would have merited immediate dismissal of the case had scienter
been the standard of liability," 8 Judge Sweigert refused to issue an
injunction against them. In addition, the court recognized that Arthur Young had conducted its activity with "good faith and judgment."'00 Thus, despite Judge Sweigert's acceptance of negligence
as the proper standard of liability, the existence of scienter on the
part of certain defendants appears to have influenced his decision.
Recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
would appear to indicate that a negligence standard will continue
to be used by that circuit in SEC enforcement actions. In Arthur
Lipper v. SEC, ,"the Second Circuit modified an SEC disciplinary
order revoking the broker-dealer registration of the defendants for
violations of rule 10b-5.11 Due to the punitive nature of SEC disciplinary proceedings, the court reasoned, the Hochfelder scienter
standard was applicable in those proceedings." 2 In likening SEC
104 Id.

i05
Id.
"'

Id. at 90,726.

107Id.

Im Id. at 90,727. Judge Sweigert found "not a scintilla of evidence that anything was
misstated or omitted by [Arthur Young] in its audit report certifications consciously,
intentionally or with fraudulent purpose to deceive either investors, the SEC or anyone else."
Id. (emphasis added).
00 Id.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,796 (2d Cir. Dec. 10,
1976), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3163 (U.S. Aug. 18, 1977) (No. 77-275).
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,796, at 90,862.
2

Id. at 90,868 n.6.
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disciplinary proceedings to private damage actions, the Second Circuit explained that both of these actions were distinguishable from
SEC fraud injunctive suits." 3 The court intimated that since SEC
fraud injunction actions are prophylactic rather than punitive in
nature,"' the Hochfelder standard did not apply in such actions.
The continuation of the Second Circuit's distinction between
rule 10b-5 damage actions and SEC fraud injunctive suits for purposes of a scienter requirement is more clearly evidenced by its
" 5 There, the Second
decision in SEC v. Universal Major Industries.
Circuit affirmed the issuance of a injunction against an attorney
for aiding and abetting violations of section 5 of the Securities Act
of 1933."' The court rejected the appellant's principal argument
that Hochfelder mandates scienter be proven to establish a violation
of section 5.17 In reaffirming its position that "in SEC proceedings
seeking equitable relief, a cause of action may be predicated upon
negligence alone, and scienter is not required,"" 8 the Second Circuit
emphasized that "Hochfelder . . . does not undermine our prior
holdings.""'
Thus, it seems that the Bausch & Lomb court's extension of the
Hochfelder reasoning to require scienter in an SEC injunction action represents a minority position. Other federal courts appear to
disagree with the Bausch & Lomb decision, indicating a belief that
the policies underlying the SEC enforcement action override the
reasoning in Hochfelder. 2oAs a result, it appears that many federal
courts will utilize the pre-Hochfelder negligence standard in ascer3 The court noted that both disciplinary and damage actions are aimed at sanctioning
past conduct. The Second Circuit believed that this factor differentiated these punitive
measures from SEC injunctive suits, "the objective of which is solely to prevent future harm."

Id.
11

Id.

546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits, inter alia, the sale of unregistered
securities through the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1970).
"I Concerning the question of scienter, the court stated that Hochfelder had no effect
on prior law in the Second Circuit. 544 F.2d at 1047. Alternatively, even if scienter were
required in an SEC enforcement action, the Second Circuit explained, the defendant's acts
had been performed "with knowledge or reckless disregard to the truth." Id.
"I Id. The defendant in Universal Major Industries contended "with some plausibility
that courts should not seek to eliminate negligent behavior by enjoining against it, because,
by definition, negligence is inadvertent and unintended." Id. n.1. The Second Circuit offered
little to refute this novel argument but expressed confidence that past panels had not disregarded this argument in reaching their decisions. Id.
Id. at 1047.
"
See notes 90-119 and accompanying text supra.
'
",
"'
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taining whether a violation of section 10(b) has occurred in an SEC
injunctive suit. It is notable, however, that in employing the negligence standard, at least one court has demonstrated an inclination
to follow the pre-Hochfelder practice of denying an injunction unless the likelihood of future violations is supported by evidence of a
willful past infraction.''
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD

The Need for Guidelines
If, as is indicated by the decisions subsequent to Hochfelder,
the courts adhere to a negligence standard in rule 10b-5 injunctive
suits, the establishment of guidelines for corporate insider conduct
would be highly desirable. A corporate official is faced with the
responsibility of making numerous decisions. Among the most difficult are determinations as to whether to release important information to the public and as to what particular moment is best to make
the information known. These decisions are complicated by the fact
that the subject of the pertinent information often may be in an
executory stage. Many times, it is impossible to ascertain the proper
time to release information regarding such vulnerable transactions
as the progress of merger negotiations, the development of a new
product, or the discovery of a new mineral strike. 22 Despite the good
faith of the corporate official at the time the decision was made, an
unfavorable change in circumstances may result in subsequent litigation.
The fact that SEC-instituted injunction proceedings may ensue
if conduct performed in good faith later appears to have been unreasonable illustrates the need for adequate guidelines for such conduct.'2 Appropriate directives would permit corporate officials to
pursue a course of conduct without fear of liability.' 2 The promulga,2, See, e.g., SEC v. Geotek, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,756 (N.D. Cal. 1976); cf. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(alternative holding).
,22See 25 EMORY L.J. 465, 477 (1976).
'' See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 881-83 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(Moore, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); 25 EMORY L.J. 465, 477 (1976).
2 The need for adequate guidelines for corporate activity has been debated for several
years. See, e.g., Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1012 (1966)
(remarks of Professor William Cary); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a FederalLaw of
Corporatio s by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964). Professor Cary
has said: "It is an illusory quest to ask the SEC to provide a blueprint of fraud ..
"
Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, supra at 1012. While urging the passage of federal
corporate law by Congress, Professor Ruder has criticized the development of federal law on
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tion of such guidelines by the Commission would mitigate some of
the injustice occasioned by the continued use of a negligence standard in injunction actions.
The Policy Aspects: Negligence v. Scienter in SEC FraudInjunction
Actions
Even if guidelines are promulgated, implementation of the negligence standard in SEC injunctive suits based on sections 10(b) and
17(a) may well be unworkable. The primary motivation for applying
a negligence standard in SEC injunction actions lies in the widely
held view that the SEC is the "statutory guardian" of the public
interest.'1 Since the public may be injured as much by a negligent
violation of the securities laws as by an intentional transgression,' 2
and because the injunction is remedial rather than retributive in
nature,2 1 the argument for a negligence standard has been persuasive.'12 Recognizing that a negligence standard may result in prejudice to the defendant, its advocates have argued that any such
unfairness will be weighed by the court in the exercise of its equitable discretion to issue the injunction.12' A negligence standard of
liability, therefore, has been advanced as being best capable of insulating the public investor from mismanagement in the financial
sphere. 30
The advocates of a negligence standard, however, consistently
have failed to recognize the punitive aspects of the SEC fraud injunction. An order enjoining fraud results in a certain amount of
embarrassment to the defendant that may have an adverse effect
the subject through a case-by-case method. Ruder, supra at 191-214.
In January 1976, the SEC organized an advisory committee to study the entire SEC
disclosure system. See Sommer, Disclosure Committee Sifting Many Sources for Its Final
Report, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1976, at 36, col. 1, at col. 2. It is hoped that in the course of its
study the SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure will formulate concrete guidelines concerning what information should be disclosed and at what point it should be revealed. See generally Kripke, An Unusual Opportunityfor Rethinking Concepts on a Fundamental Level, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1976, at 27, col. 2, at 38, cols. 3-5.
' See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1975).
',' See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 216 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
"I See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLuM. L. REV.
1057, 1061 (1969); 82 HARV. L. Rav. 938, 947 (1969).
2' See Note, Scienter and Rule lob-5, 69 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1057, 1076 (1969); 82 HARV. L.
REv. 938, 947 (1969).
'1 See Note, Scienter and Rule J1b-5, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 1057, 1076 (1969).
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on his reputation and ability to thrive in the financial community. 31
Additionally, a fraud injunction may lead to corollary sanctions for
both individual and corporate defendants. For an individual defendant, these corollary sanctions may include disqualification from
professional practice before the SEC,'32 suspension or revocation of
broker-dealer registration,'3 3 civil and criminal contempt proceedings in the event of a future violation, 134 and certain disqualifications under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940.11 With respect to a corporate defendant, the remedies
which may accompany an injunction include disgorgement of profits,3 6 imposition of special corporate procedures,137 and appointment
of a receiver,138 special counsel,3 9 or interim director to bring the
corporation into compliance with the securities laws.' The severity
of these remedies supports the view that they should only be implemented where there exists a willful violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 141
In addition to the damage inflicted by the issuance of the injunction, the mere filing of a suit by the Commission may have a
deleterious effect on the defendant. SEC investigations and suits
can last for several years,4 2 during which time the individual and
company sued must do business under the accusation of fraudulent
conduct. As a matter of course, this can have a detrimental effect
13 See Lipton, 'Bausch & Lomb' and Securities Analysts, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1976. at
1,
cols. 2-3. Courts are beginning to focus more on the adverse impact that an injunction may
have upon activities of the defendant. See, e.g., SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1191,
1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noted "harmful impact of a receiver and an injunction on the legitimate activities of the defendants").
" See SEC Rule of Practice 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1977).
" See 16 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(c) (Supp. V 1975).
"3 See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
'
Berner & Franklin, supra note 68, at 785-86.
" See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
'3 See, e.g., SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
94,556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" See, e.g., SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1966).
See Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. Rv.
1188, 1207-10 (1975).
Id. at 1204-07.
' One author has stated: "An SEC injunction can be very serious: it must be reported
on government forms, and it can destroy a business . . . ." 25 EMORY L.J. 465, 473 (1976).
Other commentators have argued that an SEC fraud injunction does more harm to a professional's business and reputation than a money judgment in a private damage action.
Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus. LAW. 105, 106
(1975); Berner & Franklin, supra note 68, at 785-86.
' See, e.g., SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 486 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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on business, reputation, and stock prices. Consequently, upon
commencement of an SEC fraud suit, the defendant often enters
into a consent decree.4 3 Moreover, the legal costs of defending
against an SEC fraud suit are usually exorbitant.' This fact was
strikingly exemplified in Geotek, where Arthur Young & Company
incurred legal costs of one million dollars and was exonerated from
liability.' The possibility that these burdens will be placed upon a
defendant solely because he may have negligently transgressed rule
10b-5 highlights the unfairness of employing a negligence standard
to determine the existence of a past violation. In fact, the refusal of
some courts to issue an injunction solely upon the basis of a past
negligent violation"' may stem from an awareness of the injustice
of the negligence standard. 4 '
Beyond the unfairness of the negligence standard, it may be
argued that negligent violations of the securities laws are incapable
of being controlled by injunction. In most instances, the "SEC fraud
injunction restrains the defendant from making any untrue statement of a material fact concerning a number of specific matters."'"
It is submitted, however, that an injunction is no more effective in
preventing future negligent misstatements than an injunction seek113
Lipton, 'Bausch & Lomb'and SecuritiesAnalysts, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1976, at 1, col.
2, at col. 3. The consent decree is widely-used by the government in regulating particular
activities most notably in the securities and antitrust fields. See 1 T. LINDSTROM & K. TIGHE,
ANTITRUST CONSET DECREES ix (1974). The feature of a consent decree most advantageous
to the defendant is that it implies no admission of an infringement of the law. Id. On the
other hand, the government is given the right to inspect books and closely regulate compliance with the terms of the decree. Id. at x.
M See Griffin, The Beleagured Accountants: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J.
759,761 (1976).
"I Mathews, Enforcement Program:Aggressive, Efficacious Despite Major Losses,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1976, at 32, col. 1, at 33, col. 1.
' See note 50 supra.
" The plight of defendant Schuman in Bausch & Lomb graphically points up the unfairness of a negligence standard, particularly in the absence of specific guidelines. In the Bausch
& Lomb opinion Judge Ward highlighted various statements by past and present SEC officials indicating the desirability of frequent and topical discussions between corporate officials
and financial analysts. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). In the event that extraordinary information is inadvertently released in the
midst of these interviews, the commissioners advocated the immediate publication of this
information. Id. These statements appear specifically to cover the situation in which Mr.
Schuman found himself enmeshed. In the course of a conversation with a financial analyst,
he inadvertently mentioned Bausch & Lomb's earnings figures. Id. at 1238. His reaction was
to publish the information. 420 F. Supp. at 1238. Yet, several years later, Mr. Schuman was
a defendant in an SEC injunctive suit which alleged that his actions were fraudulent. See
also Lipton, 'Bausch & Lomb' and SecuritiesAnalysts, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1976, at 1, col. 2"1 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1978.
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ing to restrain negligence on the highways.' Moreover, since an
anti-fraud injunction premised upon negligent conduct may be so
easily undermined by an unintentional act,'50 the issuance of such
injunctions might tend to erode judicial authority.
It appears that the imposition of a scienter requirement would
not bring about a relaxation of individual and corporate diligence.
Individuals and entities in the financial sphere have a significant
number of reasons to avoid inflicting negligent damage on investors,
including the desire to insulate themselves from multi-million dollar common law negligence actions and the need to protect their
reputations.' 5' The application of a scienter standard of liability to
all rule 10b-5 suits also would provide greater freedom of action to
the financial community. The absence of injunctive liability for
unintentional and nonreckless acts would encourage members of the
financial world to disclose important information to the public'52-information that may now be withheld due to a fear of liability.'53
, See note 118 supra.
An injunction usually is enforced by resort to contempt proceedings. It has been
indicated that the state of mind required to sustain a contempt citation is no greater than
that required to prove the initial violation of the statute. See United States v. Hill, 298 F.
Supp. 1221, 1236 (D. Conn. 1969). Therefore, use of a negligence standard in an injunction
action could result in the issuance of a contempt citation founded on mere negligence. See
SEC v. Universal Major Indus., Inc., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976) (argument of the
defendant).
"I See SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 95,532 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also Brodsky, Suing Brokerage Firm for Negligence
Under State Law, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
112 See Lipton, 'Bausch & Lomb' and Securities Analysts, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1976, at 1,
col. 2, at 4, col. 3. A major argument against a negligence standard for SEC fraud injunctive
suits is that the risk of liability is too great. This expansive liability is likely to produce a
fear of numerous suits, culminating in a severe reduction in the availability of financial
information. As Judge Moore stated in Texas Gulf Sulphur: "If press releases have to read
like prospectuses to guard against possible lob-5 liability, it is safe to predict that they will
quickly fall out of favor with corporate management." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 882 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). See also Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1012 (1966)
(remarks of Professor Cary); Note, Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1076
(1969). It is hoped that a scienter requirement would constrict the imposition of liability,
reduce the fear of suit, and result in the release of more information.
"I Lipton, 'Bausch & Lomb' and SecuritiesAnalysts, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1976, at 4, col.
1. Interestingly, it has been argued that the language of § 17(a) also requires a showing of
scienter. Berner & Franklin, supra note 68, at 796 n.221.
This view, however, has not been accepted by the courts. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976). Despite the disinclination of the courts
to accept the argument that a literal reading of § 17(a) dictates that scienter be established
in an action under that section, the arguments in favor of a scienter standard in lOb-5 actions
apply with equal force to suits brought under § 17(a). Requiring scienter in actions based on
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The PracticalEffect of a Scienter Requirement on SEC Fraud
Injunctive Suits
The circumstances under which injunctive relief is sought by
the SEC may be reduced to the following general factual settings:
(1) the discovery of a single past violation; (2) the uncovering of a
series of distinct infringements; (3) the detection of an ongoing infraction." 4 An analysis of the impact of a scienter requirement in
each of these situations will serve to illustrate that a scienter standard would not create any hardship for the SEC in its role as the
public guardian.
Requiring proof of scienter in an action based on a single past
violation would impose no new disability upon the SEC since courts
usually have denied injunctions in the absence of a willful past
violation. 5 5 Thus, requiring the SEC to plead and prove scienter in
such a situation would merely serve to prevent the waste and unfairness of an unsuccessful suit. 5 '
Imposition of a scienter requirement in an action based on a
series of distinct infringements poses a more difficult problem. Even
if the repeated actions are capable of being characterized as negligent, the defendant's frequent injury to innocent individuals argues
in favor of issuing an injunction. The possibility of a future infraction certainly is present. The issuance of an injunction in the face
of a series of negligent transgressions, however, may be justified
under a scienter standard. Since the defendant has repeatedly
harmed the public investor, it is submitted that he has manifested
that lack of care and recklessness that many courts have held to be
tantamount to intent. 5 ' Moreover, the arguments of unfairness to
§ 17(a) would prevent an illogical distinction from being made between the scienter standards
of § 10(b), which applies to fraud in both purchase and sale situations, and § 17(a), which
applies only to fraud occurring in connection with a sale. See note 2 supra. Such a dichotomy
would arise if the SEC, pursuant to the reasoning in Hochfelder, is required to prove scienter
in § 10(b) injunctive actions but not in § 17(a) injunctive suits.
114The third situation is one not frequently encountered. See Brodsky, SEC Enforcement
Weapon May Be Blunted, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1976, at 1, col. 2, at 26, col. 2. It was, however,
evidenced in the World Radio Mission case. See SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d
535 (1st Cir. 1976).
z' See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
, Even some of those who advocate the adoption of a negligence standard in SEC fraud
actions have recognized the potential unfairness of a fraud injunction based merely on a single
negligent "violation." See Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057, 1076
(1969); 82 HARV. L. REv. 938, 947 (1969).
" See notes 5 & 78 supra. The idea that repeated infractions lead to the inference of
purposeful conduct was recognized by Judge Moore in his Texas Gulf Sulphur dissent. SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 886 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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the defendant are not as strong in the face of repeated injury to the
public, reinforcing the propriety of issuing an anti-fraud injunction
under such circumstances.
The situation involving a continuing infraction more readily
comports with a scienter standard. Since the alleged violation is
ongoing, the SEC would move instantly to force its cessation. Normally, the activity would be discontinued upon receipt of a warning
from the Commission.'58 Under these circumstances, even if the recipient believed the notice to be unwarranted, the continuance of
the activity while awaiting judicial resolution of the question
whether the acts violated the law could hardly be characterized as
negligent.'59 Additionally, the unfairness of an SEC action based
solely on negligence would be lacking since the defendant would
have brought the suit upon himself by continuing the practice. An
injunction against such an individual would not only be just and
effective, but necessary.
CONCLUSION

Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Hochfelder, the federal
courts were reluctant to issue an SEC injunction based solely upon
negligent conduct. ' This attitude appears to have survived the
Hochfelder decision prompting courts to make findings of willfulness before issuing an injunction.'"' In view of this tendency, application of Hochfelder's construction of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
to SEC fraud injunction suits apparently would not alter the ultimate outcome reached in such actions.
Admittedly, strong policy considerations, particularly the
SEC's status as public guardian, weigh heavily in favor of a negligence standard. The significance of these considerations, however,
is tempered by certain countervailing factors. Since the adoption of
a scienter standard apparently would cause little, if any, difference
in the results reached in SEC fraud injunctive suits, utilization of
such a standard in all likelihood would not impair the Commission
in its role as public protector. Moreover, the adverse effects of the
negligence standard upon individual and corporate defendants mili"I See Brodsky, SEC Enforcement Weapon May Be Blunted, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1976,
at 1, col. 2, at 26, col. 2.
" See SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC
General Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, reprinted in SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 354 at F-1, F-2 (1976).
,' See note 50 supra.
,' See notes 96-109 and accompanying text supra.

19771

SEC INJUNCTIVE SUITS

785

tate in favor of a scienter requirement. Finally, a scienter standard
might serve the interests of both the SEC and the investing public
by promoting fuller disclosure of information by the financial community.
Dennis P. Orr

